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Meadows: Revisions in Abandoned and Unclaimed Property Legislation: A Look

REVISIONS IN ABANDONED AND UNCLAIMED
PROPERTY LEGISLATION: A LOOK AT THE 1981
UNIFORM UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT AND WEST
VIRGINIA'S REVISED UNIFORM ACT
I.

INTRODUCTION

High interest rates, inflation and unemployment have prompted many
states to more vigorously pursue nontax sources of revenue. One such plentiful
source of income is available to states through statutory custody of abandoned
and unclaimed property. Most legislation dealing with such custody has taken
the form of the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act (hereinafter
"Uniform Act").1 The Uniform Act, which wa originally drafted in 1954 and
has been adopted by thirty-one states and the District of Columbia (including
West Virginia 2 ), contains a comprehensive set of provisions which enable a
state to acquire custody of abandoned property when the owner cannot be located and does not appear to be aware of its existence.
The Uniform Act is being used by states to generate substantial amounts
of revenue. In the past two years alone West Virginia has received
$1,496,757.24 through the Treasurer's administration of the State's abandoned
property statute.3 New York collected over $38,000,000 in the first thirteen
years of its act, and Massachusetts collected $2,500,000 in its first year. California has projected that over $5,000,000 each year can be collected from its statute. 4 As these figures indicate, the potential of collecting significant amounts of
abandoned property provides states with a strong incentive to actively enforce
their abandoned property statutes.
The high amount of revenue generated compared to the cost of collecting
the property is an additional incentive to encourage West Virginia to more
1 UNIF. DISPOSITION OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT, 8 U.L.A. 115-56 (1972) (1954 version) (Minor revisions were made to the Uniform Act in 1966, primarily affording different treatment to
money orders and traveler's checks). See infra note 67.
2 The 1954 version of the Uniform Act was adopted by the West Virginia Legislature on February 8, 1966 and became effective on July 1, 1967. W. VA. CODE § 36-8-1 to § 36-8-31 (1982).
3 The following figures were recently released by the State Treasurer's Office of West Virginia.
They include total receipts in unclaimed property, claims paid to owners, net receipts, operating
expenses in maintaining the abandoned property division and net available to the general fund of
the state.
Fiscal Year 1981
Fiscal Year 1982
Receipts ..............................................
$638,087.80
$858,669.44
Claims ..............................................
10,527.36
21,133.31

Net Receipts ..............

..........

..............

Operating Expenses ....................................
Net Available to General Revenue ..................

$627,560.44

$837,536.13

65,334.44
$562,226.00

86,055.45
$751,480.68

Bailey, Office of the Treasurer, ANNUAL REPORT, Abandoned (Unclaimed) Property 12 (W. Va.

1982) (report covering July 1, 1981 to June 30, 1982 fiscal year).
I McBride, Unclaimed Dividends, Escheat Statutes and the Corporation Lawyer, 14 Bus.
LAW. 1062 (1959).
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vigorously pursue the collection of abandoned property.5 The Internal Revenue
Service makes a similar argument when it contends that for every dollar spent
in enforcing the tax laws, many more dollars are collected in taxes that would
otherwise remain unpaid. Keeping in mind there is a point at which the dollars-expended versus dollars-returned ratio is no longer profitable, it makes
good business sense for a state to maintain an adequately qualified and staffed
abandoned property division.
In 1981 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
adopted the third version of the Uniform Act.' It represents a major effort to
conform the Act with judicial and legislative developments that have occurred
since 1954. In addition the 1981 Act incorporates many changes recommended
by Uniform Act states which should improve the Act's effectiveness. On March
12, 1983, the West Virginia Legislature adopted revisions in its abandoned

CSG BACKUnclaimed Property (May 1982). At least 13 states have auditing programs for unclaimed property. They are: Alabama, California, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island and South Carolina. A survey completed in
early 1982 by the Wisconsin Office of State Treasurer produced the following results:
5 See STATES INFORMATION CENTER, THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS,

GROUNDER,

STATE

NUMBER OF
AUDITORS

SEPARATE
BUDGET

AVERAGE
AUDITOR
WAGE

Alabama

5

No

$11.23/hr

DOLLAR RETURNED FOR'
DOLLAR EXPENDED
1981 produced $2.99 for each
dollar expended

California

25

Yes
$1,000,000

$15.00/hr

8 to 1

Florida

1 parttime*

No

$7.13 to
9.46/hr

"Should be four times the dollar
expended"

Illinois

7

No

$6.25 to
9.38/hr

Indeterminable
Indeterminable

Maryland

1

No

$9.19/hr

$7 to $8 per dollar expended

Massachusetts

3

No

$8.00 to
9.00/hr

For FY 1980-81 each auditor
returned the cost of salary and
benefits over 73 times during the

Minnesota

3

No

$9.35/hr

"Cannot estimate"

New York

32

No

$8.13 to
19.23/hr

8 to 10 times auditors' salaries

Oregon

1

No

$7.27 to
9.19/hr

10 audits in 1981 produced
$70,500

Rhode Island

2

No

$10.15/hr

$500,000 since September 1981

year.

*Florida utilizes the assistance of State Banking Examiners, State Credit Union Examiners, Federal Credit Union Examiners, Insurance Credit Union Examiners and Department of Revenue Examiners who complete a cursory examination form and submit it to the Florida Abandoned Property Section. If a more in-depth examination is needed, the Financial Examiners will do the
examination.
' UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROPERTY

1954

versions are

titled

ACT, 8 U.L.A. 333 (Supp. 1983) (1981 version) (the 1966 and

"UNIF. DISPOSITION OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY AcT").
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property statute which incorporate some of the changes from the 1981 Uniform
Act, but ignore many others.7 These revisions make West Virginia one of the
first states to enact portions of the 1981 Act.
The purpose of this Note is to provide increased awareness of the tremendous source of revenue available through more stringent enforcement of existing abandoned property legislation, and to discuss in a considerable degree
of detail the 1981 version of the Uniform Act and the revisions adopted by the
West Virginia Legislature. The Note will briefly discuss the development of
abandoned property legislation and then will examine a few of the important
provisions of the 1954 version of the Uniform Act as they relate to the changes
adopted in the 1981 Uniform Act and those enacted in West Virginia's abandoned property statute. Finally, the substantial portion of the Note will explore the 1981 Uniform Act and West Virginia's legislation.

II.
A.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ABANDONED

PROPERTY LEGISLATION

The Historical Concept

Escheat s is a procedure with ancient origins whereby the sovereign acquired title to abandoned property if after a number of years no rightful owner
appeared.' The concept of escheat is known to have existed in England as early
as the twelfth century.' 0 At common law, escheat was only applicable to real
property and was considered an incident of tenure whereby the feudal lord had
the right to take the land in the absence of a tenant." Upon the occurrence of
some unforseen contingency, real property reverted to the grantor. 2 Bona vacantia was the term which applied to personal property passing to the
Crown."
In the United States, escheat has been regarded as the sovereign right of
the state over all its property, both real and personal. 4 The sovereign power of
the state exists because it either has actual dominion over the property, or
because it has power over the last owner of the property. 15 Although escheat of
corporate intangibles arose from the common law doctrine of bona vacantia,
the common law distinction between escheat and bona vacantia no longer ex-

7

Enrolled Comm. Sub., H.B. 1454 (1983). (The revisions passed by the legislature were signed

by Governor Rockefeller on March 19, 1983. The effective date of the revised act is June 10, 1983).
' Escheat is defined as the reversion of property to the state in consequence of the absence of
any individual competent to inherit. The state is deemed to occupy the place and hold the rights
of the feudal lord. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 640 (rev. 4th ed. 1951). The word itself is originally

French or Norman, in which language it signifies chance or accident. In re Ohlsen's Estate, 158 Or.
197, 75 P.2d 6 (1938).

1 Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 671 (1965).
10L. SIMES, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 9 (1936).
11 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 353 (2d ed. 1936).
12 See, e.g., Sands v. Lynham, 27 Va. 474 (291 Gratt. 1876).
'3 Although personal property technically did not escheat, the Crown took it because it was

without an owner, or was bona vacantia. W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 11.
14 In re Melrose Ave., 234 N.Y. 48, 136 N.E. 235 (1922).
"8 See Connecticut Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U.S. 541 (1947).
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ists'6 and both apply to real and personal property. 1
B.

Justifications For and Types of Modern Escheat Statutes

In more modern times many explanations are given to justify abandoned
property legislation. These rationalizations include, inter alia, protecting the
rights of owners; preventing windfalls to corporations; and the economic advantage of returning funds to commerce.18 Although there is arguably some
merit to each of these justifications, the real underlying reason for passage of
abandoned property legislation appears to be the state's desire to collect revenue. 19 The tremendous potential for nontax revenue has prompted almost
every state to pass some type of abandoned property statute. 0
The Uniform Act and the overwhelming majority of modern escheat statutes are custodial as opposed to permanent escheat statutes. The custodial
statutes treat the state as the custodian of the abandoned property. The true
owner keeps title to the property and retains the right to present a claim to the
state and recover the property at any time in the future." The permanent escheat statutes, like their feudal predecessors, vest title in the state upon the
passage of a certain amount of time, after which the true owner's claim is
barred. 2 While the distinctions between custodial and permanent escheat statutes appear significant, the significance of the distinction is diminished because even though the true owner retains title to the property under custodial
statutes, rarely does the owner ever present a claim for recovery of his
property."

III. THE 1954 VERSION OF THE UNIFORM ACT
Before 1954 holders 2'4 of abandoned property frequently faced problems of
"

Note, Origins and Development of Modern Escheat, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1319 (1961).
See Comment, Unclaimed Property-A Potential Source of Non-Tax Revenue, 45 Mo.
LAW REV. 493 (1980); Comment, Escheat of Corporate Intangibles: Will the State of the Stockholders Last Known Address be Able to Enforce Its Right? 41 NOTRE DAo E LAW 559 (1966); Comment, A Survey of State Abandoned or Unclaimed Property Statutes, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J. 85
(1964).
"8 For an excellent discussion of the rationales for escheat see Comment, Modern Rationales
of Escheat, U. PA. L. REV. 95 (1963).
Comment, Escheat of Intangibles:The Conflicts ProblemsRemain, 34 U. PITT. L. REV. 671
(1972).
10 Forty-eight states and the District of Columbia have some form of escheat or abandoned
property legislation. UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT, 8 U.L.A. 335 (Supp. 1983) (1981 version).
21 See Comment, Modern Rationales of Escheat, supra note 18; Comment, Unclaimed Property-A Potential Source of Non-Tax Revenue, supra note 17.
22 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 37-38 (West 1952) (the lawful owner has two years to make a
claim); C.G.S.A. § 50 (1978) (the lawful owner has twenty years to make a claim).
23 Only a very small percentage of the property paid to the state is ever claimed by its owner.
Mr. John McCabe, Research Director for the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws estimates that for every dollar of unclaimed property collected by the state, only a few
cents are ever claimed by the owner. CSG BACKOROUNDER, supra note 5.
2, The term "holder" is defined as a person who is in possession of property subject to this
Act belonging to another, or who is a trustee in case of a trust, or is indebted to another on an
7

'9
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exceedingly diverse state statutes and the possibility of multiple liability.
25
Many state laws had contrary provisions and often were not well formulated.
These statutes commonly applied to different types of property and required a
holder to comply with varying procedures. This lack of symmetry created
problems for public corporations who were often faced with the onerous burden of complying with many different statutes. In addition they were faced
with the possibility of multiple liability. The United States Supreme Court
8
opinions, Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey"
and Connecticut Mutual Life In27
surance Co. v. Moore, demonstrated this serious problem.
In Moore, the Court held that the state of New York could take possession
of unclaimed money due on insurance policies issued to persons in New York
even though the holder, the insurance company, was domiciled in another
state. The Court found that New York could properly assert jurisdiction over
the insurance company because of the relationship of the policyholders to the
state. 28 In Standard Oil Co. the Court held that New Jersey, the domicile of
the holder, could claim stock and stock dividends belonging to residents who
lived in New York. The Court found that New Jersey could assert jurisdiction
over the holder because of the holder's domicile in that state.29 By showing
that the state of the owner and the state of the holder could each collect the
abandoned property, together, these decisions demonstrated the possibility
that a holder could be subject to multiple liability for the same property when
two or more states, each having a valid jurisdiction over the abandoned property, exercised that jurisdiction."0
The inevitable remedy for the possibility of multiple liability and other
problems presented by diverse state statutes was uniform legislation. The 1954
Uniform Act contains thirty-two provisions which may be described in several
general areas. It contains definitions"1 and provisions defining and describing
the circumstances under which various classes of property are presumed abandoned. 3 2 A catch-all provision subjects "[a]ll intangible personal property, not

obligation subject to this Act. UNIF. DIsPosIIoN OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT,8 U.L.A. § 1(d) at
121 (1972) (1954 version). The 1981 version of the Uniform Act expressly provides that the term
"[h]older means a person wherever organized or domiciled. . . ." UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROPERTY AcT,
8 U.L.A. § 1(8) at 339 (Supp. 1983). The definition is significant because it makes it clear the Act
applies to "persons wherever organized or domiciled," notwithstanding the fact that the escheating
state may have difficulty asserting personal jurisdiction over the holder. See infra notes 44-66 and
accompanying text. The term "person" is defined to include any legal or commercial entity. UNIF.
UNCLAIMED PROPERTY AcT, 8 U.L.A. § 1(13) at 340.
25 UNIF. DISPOSITION OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT, 8 U.L.A. 115 (1972) (Commissioners' Pref-

atory Note to the 1954 version).
26341 U.S. 428 (1951).
27 333 U.S. 541 (1947).
28 Id. at 548-51.

2"341 U.S. at 348-49.
30 UNIF. DISPOSITION OF

UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT,8 U.L.A. 116 (1972) (Commissioners' Pref-

atory Note to the 1954 version).
I,Id. § 1 at 123.

Classes of property subject to the Uniform Act include the following: Property held by
banking or financial organizations or by business associations, section 2; unclaimed funds held by
life insurance corporations, section 3; deposits and refunds held by utilities, section 4; undistrib22
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." to the presumption of abandonment if not

claimed by the owner for more than seven years after it first became payable or
distributable.3
The real heart of the 1954 version of the Uniform Act is contained in section 10. It was drafted specifically to alleviate the problems of multiple liability
presented by Moore and Standard Oil Co. It provides:
If specific property which is subject to the provisions of [several of the previous
sections which presume various classes of property abandoned and] is held for
or owed or distributable to an owner whose last known address is in another
state by a holder who is subjected to the jurisdictionof that state, the specific

property is not presumed abandoned in this state and subject to this act if:
(a) It may be claimed as abandoned or escheated under the laws of such
other state; and
(b) The laws of such other state make reciprocal provision that similar
specific property is not presumed abandoned or escheatable by such other
state when held for or owed or distributable to an owner whose last known
address is34within this state by the holder who is subject to the jurisdiction of
this state.

If we assume, in Standard Oil Co., that both New Jersey and New York had
the reciprocal provision required by section 10(b), and that both states had
escheat statutes applicable to the property, then pursuant to section 10, only
New York could have validly asserted its jurisdiction and collected the property as the state of the last known address of the owner. The ability of section
10 to prevent multiple liability, therefore, was dependent upon each involved
state enacting the reciprocal provision required by section 10(b).
Most of the remaining sections of the 1954 Uniform Act cover a broad
range of procedures necessary to administer the Act.3 5 One of these relieves the
holder of all liability to the extent of the value of the property paid or delivered to the state.3 6 Any subsequent claims the owner makes after the property
is paid to the state must be made to the state.
The final seven sections of the
37
Act provide general rules of construction.
IV.

PROBLEMS REMAINING AFTER THE

1954 UNIFORM ACT

Although section 10 eliminated multiple liability where each state attempting to assert jurisdiction over the holder had a section 10(b) reciprocal
provision, the possibility of multiple liability persisted in the event a state atuted dividends and distributions of business associations, section 5; property of business associations and banking or financial organizations held in the course of dissolution, section 6; property
held by fiduciaries, section 7; and property held by state courts and public officers and agencies,
section 8. Id. at 123-32.
11 Id. § 9 at 133. The length of time which must pass before a presumption of abandonment
takes effect is commonly termed the "dormancy period." The dormancy period for most types of
property in the 1954 and 1966 versions of the Uniform Act is seven years.
11 Id. § 10 at 134-35.
35

See generally, id. at 136-56.

11 Id. § 14 at 141.
37 Id. at 154-56.
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tempting to assert jurisdiction did not have such a provision. Finally, in Western Union v. Pennsylvania the Supreme Court eliminated any chance that a
holder could be subject to multiple liability for the same property. Pennsylvania sought to recover unclaimed money orders purchased in Pennsylvania,
but some of these had already been collected by New York, the state of the
holder's domicile. The Court held that due process required the holder to be
protected against liability in another state before being required to pay the
abandoned property to any state.3 9 Western Union did not consider which
state is entitled to priority when different states presented claims for the same
property.
The most celebrated decision involving abandoned property was rendered
in 1965. In the landmark decision of Texas v. New Jersey4 0 the Court finally
decided which state had priority when more than one state attempted to collect the same property. Four different states asserted the right to collect abandoned property held by Sun Oil Company. Texas claimed the property because
it was located there, New Jersey because it was Sun Oil Company's domicile,
Pennsylvania because Sun Oil maintained its principle office there and Florida
because it was the state of the owner's last known address on the corporation's
books. The Court adopted the rule proposed by Florida for the following
reasons:
The rule recommended by the Master will tend to distribute escheats among
the States in the proportion of the commercial activities of their residents. And
by using a standard of last known address, rather than technical legal concepts
of residence and domicile, administration and application of escheat laws
should be simplified. It may well be that some addresses left by vanished creditors will be in States other than those in which they lived at the time the
obligation arose or at the time of the escheat. But such situations probably will
be the exception and any errors thus created, if indeed they could be called
errors, probably will tend to a large extent to cancel each other out. 41
Although the Supreme Court adopted a rule which is easy to administer
and tends to distribute escheats to states in proportion of the commercial activities of their residents, it left several questions unanswered. 42 It did not consider what happens when the holder's records do not contain the owner's address.43 This often occurs with money orders because the holder's records
normally disclose only where the money order was sold, not the owner's address. It also did not consider a much more serious problem, that the state of
the last known address of the owner may not be able to assert personal jurisdiction over the holder." Where that is the case, the right given by Texas v.

38 368 U.S. 71 (1961).

39 Id. at 80.
40 379 U.S. 671 (1965).
41 Id. at 679.
42

See, e.g., Comment, Escheat of CorporateIntangibles: Will the State of the Stockholder's

Last Known Address be Able to Enforce Its Right?, supra note 17 at 568.
43 See E. ScoLEs
44

& P. HAY,

CONFLICT OF LAws

See supra note 42 and accompanying text.

227 (1982).
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New Jersey appears to be meaningless.' 5 The question of jurisdiction was
neither argued nor briefed in Texas v. New Jersey.4
The problem presented with money orders was solved in 1974 by federal
legislation which modified the rule in Texas v. New Jersey as it relates to
money orders, traveler's checks and similar written instruments. 47 Since addresses of purchasers were not generally retained and most purchasers resided
in the state of purchase, the legislation
provides that only the state of purchase
4
is entitled to escheat such property. "
The most perplexing problem facing states which compel the escheat of
abandoned property, however, is the question of personal jurisdiction sufficient
to satisfy due process.4" Escheat is conditioned on the state's power td claim
jurisdiction over the property or persons having an interest in the property. 0
With respect to tangible property, real and personal, the rule in all jurisdictions is only the state in which the property is located may escheat.5 1 The difficulty arises with respect to intangible property which has no definite situs.52
There are no jurisdictional problems when all the parties having an interest in
the property reside in the same state, but when more than one state is involved, control over intangible property can "only arise from control or power
over the persons whose relationships are the source of the rights and obligations."5 3 There are two main jurisdictional hurdles that confront a state which
attempts to collect abandoned property from a holder. The state must have
jurisdiction to compel reports in order to discover the existence of the property
and jurisdiction to sue for payment of the property.
The ability of a state to compel a corporation (holder) to file abandoned
property reports is contingent upon that state's jurisdiction to regulate the corporation. 5 ' A state clearly has such jurisdiction over domestic corporations, but
the question is much more complex when a foreign corporation is involved.
Each act of the foreign corporation must be considered in determining whether
it may be regulated. 55 It is unlikely, however, under any theory of regulation
based on "doing business" or "contacts" that a state could obtain jurisdiction
over a foreign corporation if its only contact with the state was that one of its
shareholders lived there at one time,56 or that it solicited subscriptions to its
capital stock or sold or exchanged its shares of stock in that state.57 The West
45 UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT,8 U.L.A. 337 (Supp. 1983) (1981 version).

4"Id.
4-

12 U.S.C.A. § 2501 (1976).

" 12 U.S.C.A. § 2503 (1976).
4 See supra note 42.
50 See, e.g., State v. American Sugar Refining Co., 20 N.J. 286, 119 A.2d 767 (1956).
'1 Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. at 677.
52 Intangible property is not a physical matter which can be easily located in one state. The
creditor may live in one state and the debtor in another. If the debtor is a corporation with connections in many states, the problem is compounded. Id.
11 Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 548 (1948).
5 See supra note 42.
55 Penberthy Electromelt Co. v. Star City Glass Co., 148 W. Va. 419, 135 S.E.2d 289 (1964).
5See supra note 42 at 569.
17 This is the majority rule. See, e.g., Payson v. Withers, 19 F. Cas. 29 (C.C.D. Ind. 1873) (No.
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Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has indicated that a foreign corporation
which has not been admitted to hold property and transact business within the
state is nevertheless not prohibited from selling its shares of capital stock in
the state, nor from maintaining suits for enforcement of its contracts for such
sales, and that "[h]olding property and doing business relates to the ordinary
purposes for which the corporation was formed; hence the sale of its capital
stock is not within the meaning of the statute and does not constitute doing
business."58
It is also clear that the due process clause does not permit a state to make
a binding judgment against an individual or corporate defendant with which
the state has "no contacts, ties or relations." 9 The relationship between the
defendant and the forum must be such that it is "reasonable" to require the
0
corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there.2
The burden
on the defendant is a primary concern, but it must be considered in light of
other factors, including the following: the forum state's interest in adjudicating
the dispute;6 1 the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief;62 the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient
resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several states in furthering substantive policies.6 In order for a state to sue a foreign corporation
in its own courts to compel the payment of abandoned property to such state,
it must obtain personal jurisdiction over the foreign corporation. Essentially,
the corporation must satisfy the "minimum contacts" of InternationalShoe v.
Washington6 4 before it is subject to suit in a particular state.
Although the state of the last known address of the owner may have difficulty compelling a foreign corporation to file reports and pay abandoned property when its only contact with the state is the sale of stock to a shareholder
who once lived there, the right given that state as the first priority claimant in
Texas v. New Jersey is not meaningless. Many foreign corporations will have
sufficient contacts with the escheating state to subject them to that state's jurisdiction. Also, the threat of suit in the corporation's own state may be sufficient incentive for it to comply. It has also been argued that footnote eight in

10,864); W.

FLETCHER,

CYCLOPEDIA OF

THE

LAW

OF

PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

§

8489 (rev. perm. ed.

1977); but see, Langston v. Phillips, 206 Ala. 174, 89 So. 523 (1921); Jones v. Martin, 15 Ala. App.
675, 74 So. 761 (1917) which indicate that the sale of stock is deemed to be the exercise of a
corporate function within the meaning of its constitutional and statutory provisions imposing conditions upon foreign corporations transacting any business in the state.
:8Cumberland Co-op Bakeries v. Lawson, 91 W. Va. 245, 247, 112 S.E. 568, 569 (1922).
9 See International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) ("due process requires only that
in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he not be present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend the 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'") Id. at 316.
:0 Id. at 317; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
61 See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
62 Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978). The interest is at least recognized when it is not adequately protected by the plaintiff's power to choose the forum. World
Wide Volkswagon Co., 444 U.S. at 292 citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211 n.37 (1977).
63 Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. at 93, 98.
64 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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Texas v. New Jersey implies that the state has legislative power to compel
reports from a foreign corporation. 5 Finally, it is possible that the state of the
last known address of the shareholder can compel the reports and collect abandoned property from a foreign corporation through "succession analysis." 0
V.

THE

1981

VERSION OF THE UNIFORM ACT

A. Introduction
Although the Uniform Act has existed since 1954, there have been no major revisions.67 Meanwhile, the decision in Texas v. New Jersey has caused
holders considerable uncertainty in determining the current status of abandoned property legislation. In some instances holders feel they do not know
what is required of them. More importantly, the uncertain status and ineffective penalty provisions 8 helped cause the high degree of noncompliance.E The
65 UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT, 8 U.L.A. 335, n.2 (Supp. 1983) (1981 version) (However, it
is unclear how this legislative power exists because the Constitution requires personal jurisdiction

sufficient to satisfy due process).
66 The Commissioners' Prefatory Note to the 1981 version of the Uniform Act suggests that
the state of the last known address of the shareholder can compel the foreign corporation to submit reports and pay abandoned property through "succession analysis." In Texas v. New Jersey,
the Court adopted Florida's rule that an intangible debt is property of the creditor and not the
debtor. The Court noted that the Florida rule is a variation of the concept of mobilia sequuntor
personam, which says that intangible property is found at the domicile of its owner and the law of
the state of domicile of the intestate owner determines the right of succession to personal property.
The succession analysis rationale which permits the state of the last known address of the owner to
compel a foreign corporation to submit reports and pay abandoned property is "[t]he state in
which the owner last resided is a rough indicator of domicile, and that state is entitled to provide
by legislation for succession. The state of last known address, succeeding to the right of the owner,
is entitled to compel a holder to disclose the existence of property which belongs to the owner in
the same manner that a conservator of an estate of an incompetent or the administrator of the
estate of a missing person or decedent can compel the holder of that person's property to account
for it." Id. at 335.
17 The Uniform Act was amended in 1966, but its provisions are substantially the same as the
1954 version. The Commissioners' Prefatory Note to the 1966 version of the Uniform Act explains
the revisions that were made. "In the operation of the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property
Act of 1954 and similar acts, special problems have arisen concerning money orders and travelers
checks, particularly those issued by an organization not properly classified as a 'banking or
financial institution.' The Act was revised, therefore, to take care of these problems. Section 2 has
been amended by adding to the persons covered by the section, the phrase 'a business association.'
In subsection (c) the phrase 'money orders' is added to the types of sums payable and a special
rule concerning the time at which abandonment is presumed is established for traveler's checks.
For all property subject to the section, other than traveler's checks, seven years from the date
payable raises the presumption of abandonment but a longer period, 15 years from the date of
issuance is established for traveler's checks. Section 11 of the original Act, requiring a report by
the holder of abandoned property, is amended to eliminate the requirement of reporting the name
and address of the owner with respect to 'traveler's checks and money orders.' Section 12 of the
Act which required notice and publication of lists of abandoned property is also amended to eliminate traveler's checks and money orders from the requirement of publication of a list. Both of
these amendments are necessary because of the inability of the issuer of money orders and traveler's checks to know who the holder is in most cases." UNIF. DIsPoSITiON OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY
ACT, 8 U.L.A. 74 (1972) (1966 version).
" See UNIF. DIsPOSITION OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT, 8 U.L.A. § 25 at 111 (1972) (1966
version).
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consequences of these and other shortcomings of the original Uniform Act, discovered primarily through the experience of Uniform Act states, has resulted
in the substantial changes contained in the 1981 version. The primary objectives of the 1981 Uniform Act which contains nine novel provisions,7° are to
obtain compliance and to maximize the ability of states to collect abandoned
property, thereby increasing state revenues. 1
B. Definitions
Section 1 contains a much more comprehensive list of definitions and
terms than the definitional section in the earlier Act. The term "holder" is
defined to expressly include a "person" wherever organized or domiciled. This
eliminates any requirement that this person be actually engaged in business in
the enacting state as implied by the earlier versions.7 2 The term "apparent
owner" is added to make it clear that the person whose name and address
appears on the holder's records is to be referred to in determining which state
is entitled to claim the abandoned property.7 3 If the person whose name appears in the holder's records has transferred his interest to a person in another
state, the transferee state is entitled to claim the property pursuant to section
25.74 The definition of "business associations" is amended to expressly include
nonprofit corporations.7 5 The definition of "insurance company" is expanded
to include nearly every conceivable type of entity providing insurance coverage. 78 The term "intangible property" is added to make holders aware of a

variety of items which are covered by the Act.77 This more comprehensive defi:9

UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROPERTY AcT, 8 U.L.A. 333 (Supp. 1983) (1981 version).

These provisions are as follows: General Rules for Taking Custody of Intangible Unclaimed
Property, section 3; Crediting of Dividends, Interest or Increments to Owner's Account, section 21;
Claim of Another State to Recover Property; Procedure, section 25; Destruction or Disposition of
Property Having Insubstantial Commercial Value, section 28; Retention of Records, section 31;
Interstate Agreements and Cooperation; Joint and Rec. Actions with Other States, section 33;
Agreements to Locate Reported Property, section 35; Foreign Transactions, section 36; and Effect
of New Provisions, section 37. Id.
70

7.
73

Id.
Id. § 1 at 339-40.
Id.

71'

See infra note 117 and accompanying text.

71

71 UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT, 8 U.L.A. § 1 at 339-40 (Supp. 1983) (1981 version).
76

Id.

77 The term "intangible property" includes the following

"(i) monies, checks, drafts, deposits, interest, dividends, and income;
(ii) credit balances, customer overpayments, gift certificates, security unidentified
remittances;
(iii) stocks and other intangible ownership interests in business associations;
(iv) monies deposited to redeem stocks, bonds, coupons, and other securities, or to make
distributions;
(v) amounts due and payable under the terms of insurance policies; and
(vi) amounts distributable from a trust or custodial fund established under a plan to
provide health, welfare, pension, vacation, severance, retirement, death, stock
purchase, profit sharing, employee savings, supplemental unemployment insurance,
or similar benefits.
Id. § 1(10) at 340.
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nitional section is unquestionably important in enhancing compliance. It defines with more precision the various institutions covered by the Act. Improved
definitions make it much less likely a holder could successfully argue that it, or
a particular item of intangible property it holds, is not subject to the Act.
C.

The Omnibus Provision

Section 2 is the catch-all counterpart of section 9 of the earlier Act. It
provides that all intangible property, including income from such property less
lawful charges, which is held, issued or owing in the holder's ordinary course of
business and remains unclaimed for more than five years is presumed abandoned under the Act.78 Significantly, section 2 reduces the previous general
dormancy period from seven years to five years. The Commissioners' rationale
for this reduction is the greater mobility of the population as compared with
almost thirty years ago, and the fact that states with shorter dormancy periods
have been able to return to owners a substantially higher percentage of property reported as abandoned.9 A shorter dormancy period will logically increase
the amount of abandoned property which is collected by the states because the
longer a state must walt before collecting abandoned property, the less likely it
is that the state will actually collect the property. With longer dormancy periods holders might lose, dispose of, or otherwise fail to report the property. It is
not likely, however, that shorter dormancy periods will be welcomed by holders
because they will lose the benefit of the use of the property sooner.
D. Conforming With Texas v. New Jersey
The most significant change in the 1981 Uniform Act is the section 3
description of the general circumstances under which a state may claim abandoned intangible property.8 0 It is specifically written in response to, and is consistent with, the Supreme Court's decision in Texas v. New Jersey. It is jurisdictional in that it empowers the state to assert custody, but it also establishes
a hierarchy of priorities consistent with Texas v. New Jersey, limiting the ability of certain states to assert jurisdiction. The state of the last known address
of the owner is entitled to claim the abandoned property first."' If that state

11 Id. § 2(a) at 341.
70 Id. at Commissioners' Comment.
80Id. § 3 at 342.

"' There are three different situations in which state X, the state of the last known address of
the owner, is entitled to claim the property. The most common situation is where the holder's
records show that the identity of the owner and the owner's last known address is in state X.
Paragraph (2) permits state X to claim the property even if the owner's identity is not known, as
long as it is shown, either through the holder's records or by some other means, that the property
was owned by a person whose last known address was in state X. Paragraph (3) permits state X to
claim the property, even though there is property owed to persons for whom there are no addresses, when it can be established that the last known address of the owner is in state X. Usually
in such a situation, the state of the holder's domicile will collect the property, but once it is established the last known address of the owner in state X and not the state of the holder's domicile,
then state X is entitled to recover the property pursuant to § 25 as the first priority claimant. Id.
at 343 (Commissioners' Comment).
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cannot claim the property, the state of the holder's domicile is entitled to it."2
Section 3 also provides an answer to a question not presented in Texas v. New
Jersey. If neither the state of the last known address of the owner nor the state
of the holder's domicile can claim the property, the state in which the transaction out of which the property arose can." In essence, section 3 provides a
three-tiered priority scheme to determine which state is entitled to claim the
abandoned property.
E. Classes of Property Subject to the Act
Sections 4 through 16 describe in considerable detail the various classes of
intangible property subject to the Act. Section 4 provides that any sum payable on a traveler's check or on a money order is presumed abandoned under
the Act if the owner has not contacted the holder concerning it for the requisite period. 4 The dormancy period is fifteen years for traveler's checks and
seven years for money orders. The Commissioner's comment to section 4 indicates that statistical and economic evidence have shown the longer periods to
be appropriate with respect to traveler's checks and money orders.8 5 Subsections (d) and (e) adopt the rules provided by congressional legislation and determine which state is entitled to claim the property described in section 4.86
Sections 5 through 9 continue the original Act's coverage of sums payable
on a check, draft or similar instruments, 17 demand, savings or matured time
deposits with a banking or financial organization, 8 funds held or owing under
life or endowment insurance policies,8 9 deposits held by utilities,90 and refunds
held by business associations.9 1 Although these sections are substantially the
same as sections 2 through 4 of the earlier Uniform Act, significantly, they
shorten the dormancy periods for such property.
82 The state of the last known address of the owner cannot assert its jurisdiction over the
property if it does not have an escheat statute, or if its escheat statute is not applicable to the
particular type of property. Subsection (5) permits the state of the holder's domicile to claim the
property if the last known address of the owner is in a foreign nation. Id. at § 3(5).
83 This is a situation that was never considered in Texas v. New Jersey, presumably because
it was thought to be so unlikely. The situation has, in fact, arisen in Sperry & Hutchinson, Co. v.
O'Connor, 412 A.2d 539 (Pa. 1980). Pennsylvania sought to escheat unredeemed trading stamps
which were sold by a corporation domiciled in New Jersey to retailers located in Pennsylvania.
There were no addresses of the trading stamp purchasers, so the first priority claimant in Texas v.
New Jersey, the state of the last known address of the owner, was not applicable. The second
priority claimant was New Jersey, the state of the. holder's domicile, but it was not permitted,
under its law, to escheat trading stamps. Therefore, Pennsylvania's claim was upheld in the lower
courts as the third priority claimant. UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT, 8 U.L.A. § 3 at 343 (Supp.
1983) (1981 version).
84

Id. § 4 at 344.

85

Id. at 345 (Commissioners' Comment).

:6 See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
7 UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROPERTY AcT, 8 U.L.A. § 5 at 345-46 (Supp. 1983) (1981 version).

§ 6 at 346.
§ 7 at 347-48.
:0 Id. § 8 at 349.
88 Id.
89 Id.

91 Id. § 9 at 349-50.
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Section 10 is a novel provisions2 which expressly makes the Act applicable
to shares of stock and principal amounts of debt securities which are in the
possession of the apparent owner." It should be noted that section 10 differs
from other sections governing classes of intangible property because it applies
to property which is not in the actual possession of the holder. For this reason,
before a presumption of abandonment takes effect, there must be at least
seven years during which the owner has failed to claim a dividend or distribution or has not otherwise communicated with the holder concerning such ownership interest. During the seven year period, there must also have been at
least seven dividends, distributions or other sums paid by the holder, none of
which that have been claimed by the owner.9 4 The extra protections afforded
the owner in section 10 (requiring a longer dormancy period and at least seven
unclaimed dividends) represent a desire by the drafters of the Uniform Act to
protect the owner's rights and to make sure the stock certificates have been
abandoned. Section 10 does not apply to any ownership interest which is enrolled in a dividend re-investment plan, unless the owner has other stock which
is not in the plan and would otherwise be presumed abandoned under section
10.11 Although the 1966 version was technically applicable to underlying ownership interests, it was often assumed by holders that underlying shares were
not subject to escheat unless the shares were in the actual possession of the
holder. An explicit provision subjecting stock certificates to the Act is desirable
because holders can no longer refuse, in good faith, to report such ownership
interests.
Sections 11 through 13 subject intangible property distributable in the
course of dissolution of a business association,9 6 and intangible property held
by courts and public agencies, s7 to the Act.
Under section 14 the holder must report gift certificates and credit memos
which remain unclaimed for more than five years.9 Presumably, the omnibus
provision (section 9 of the earlier Uniform Act) covered gift certificates and
credit memos, but holders routinely failed to report such property. Much like
section 10, section 14 makes holders aware that gift certificates and credit
memos are explicitly covered by the Act, which should aid the administrator in
obtaining compliance.
In section 15, unpaid wages owing in the ordinary course of the holder's

92

Id. § 10 at 350.

,S Although the earlier Uniform Acts did not expressly provide for the escheat of shares of
stock, section 5 arguably covered such shares, and the catch-all provision, section 9, was intended
to extend its coverage to shares of stock. However, since no provision expressly applied, holders
were uncertain of the Act's applicability to underlying shares and non-compliance often resulted.
Several states have enacted specific statutory provisions making underlying shares subject to escheat to clear up any uncertainty. Id. at 351-52. (Commissioners' Comment).
- Id. § 10(b).
,' Id.

§ 10(e).

Id. § 11 at 352 (reducing the dormancy period from two years to one year).
SId. §§ 12 and 13 at 352-53.
98 Id.

§

14 at 353.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol85/iss5/9

14

Meadows: Revisions in Abandoned and Unclaimed Property Legislation: A Look

UNCLAIMED PROPERTY

1983]

business are presumed abandoned if unclaimed for more than one year.ss The
chances of locating the missing owner of a wage check are much less than the
chances of locating the owner of most other types of intangible property, so the
dormancy period is reduced from seven years to only one year. 0 0
Section 16 makes the Act applicable to the contents of safety deposit
boxes which remain unclaimed for more than five years after the owner's lease
or rental period has expired. 1' 0 The dormancy period for the contents of safety
deposit boxes was seven years in the earlier Act. It is the only section of the
Act which applies to both tangible and intangible property.
F.

Procedures and Administration

Section 17 of the Act compels the holder of both tangible and intangible
property, which is presumed abandoned by operation of the previous sections,
to report such property to the state administrator.0 2 The report which must be
filed is virtually identical to the report required by section 11 of the earlier
Act. 0 3 However, the minimum value of property held for which the name and
address of the owner must be reported is increased along with the value of
items that may be reported in the aggregate.' 0 ' This is justified because it minimizes the holder's reporting expenses. Rather than the "due diligence" re-

:9 Id. § 15 at 354.
100

Id. (Commissioners' Comment).

101 Id.

§ 16. Tangible property located in safety deposit boxes is difficult to collect. Intangible
property is represented by some type of ownership interest and is usually recorded, but tangible
property is the item itself. Whether tangible property abandoned in safety deposit boxes is ever
reported depends on the good faith efforts of the holders in disclosing this information. There are
very few, if any, ways to verify whether an empty safety deposit box contained abandoned property which was improperly removed.
102 Id. § 17 at 354-55. A holder should carefully check the statute of each state for which a
report is to be filed. Some states require that a report be filed each year even if the holder has no
property which is subject to the presumption of abandonment. West Virginia has no such
requirement.
103 The report required is peculiar to each state, but each requests similar kinds of information. The report must be verified by the holder's chief fiscal officer, and must include the following:
(1) the name, if known and last known address, if any, of each person appearing from the records
to be the owner of any property of a minimum value or more presumed abandoned under the Act;
(2) the nature and identifying number, if any, or description of the property, and the amount
appearing from the holder's records to be due, which may be reported in the aggregate if the value
is less than a certain minimum amount; (3) the date when the property became payable, demandable, or returnable, and the date of the last transaction with the owner concerning the property;
and (4) any other information which the administrator prescribes by rules as necessary.
If the holder is a successor to other persons who previously held property for the owner, or if the
holder has changed its name while holding property, all prior names and addresses of the holder or
of previous holders should be fied, if known. The report must be filed before a certain date of each
year, but the state administrator may postpone the date of filing upon written request by the
holder. Id. at 355.
104 The minimum value for which the name and last known address of each owner must be
reported is increased from three dollars in the earlier Acts to twenty-five dollars in the 1981 Act.
Likewise, the minimum value for which the nature and identifying number, or the description of
the property may be reported in the aggregate is increased from three dollars to twenty-five dollars. Id.
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quirement holders were previously forced to comply with in attempting to locate the owner, section 17(e) provides that the holder need only send written
notice to the apparent owner's last known address within 120 days of filing the
report. 10 5 This provides the holder with a definite procedure to follow and relieves it from the uncertainty of knowing whether it satisfies the "due diligence" standard in attempting to locate the owner.
After the holder files the necessary report, section 18 requires the administrator to cause a notice to be published to attempt to notify the owner that his
property will soon escheat to the state. 06 The minimum value of items which
must be advertised is higher to reflect the increased cost of advertising since
the earlier Uniform Act. Pursuant to section 19, the holder is required to deliver the abandoned property to the state administrator within six months after reporting its existence.10
Section 20, like section 14 of the earlier Act, is a critical provision which
relieves the holder from liability, to the extent of the value of the property, for
property paid or delivered to the state in "good faith." 0 8 A "good faith" requirement prevents the holder from purposely delivering property to the state
which is not subject to abandonment. Arguably, without such a "good faith"
requirement, the owner would have no remedy against a holder who willfully
disregarded the provisions of the Act.
Section 21 permits the owner to recover increments accruing'0 9 on the
property, other than money, before the property is liquidated (which occurs in
section 22).11 This is an important provision for owners because section 15 of
205 This requires the holder to attempt to locate the owner and try to prevent abandonment.
The holder is only required to send such written notice if, "(i) the holder has in its records an
address for the apparent owner which the holder's records do not disclose to be inaccurate, (ii) the
claim of the apparent owner is not barred by the statute of limitations, and (iii) the property has a
value of $50 or more." Id.; see UNIF. DISPOSITIoN OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY AcT, 8 U.L.A. § 11(c) at
97 (1972) (1966 version) ("Due diligence").
106Id. § 18 at 356.
107 The six month period is designed to provide the owner with an opportunity to recover his
property directly from the holder before the property is paid or delivered to the state administrator. Presumably, the attempts by the holder and the state administrator to contact the owner,
pursuant to sections 17 and 18, will stimulate the owner to claim his property from the holder
within such six month period. After the property is delivered to the state administrator, the owner
must comply with section 24 and 26 to recover his property. Id. § 19 at 357.
203 If the holder pays or delivers property to the state administrator in "good faith" and the
owner later claims the property, the state shall defend the holder against the claim and indemnify
the holder against any liability arising on the claim. Id. § 20 at 358. Good faith means, "(1) payment or delivery was made in a reasonable attempt to comply with this Act; (2) the person delivering the property was not a fiduciary then in breach of trust in respect to the property and had a
reasonable basis for believing, based on the facts then known to him, that the property was abandoned for the purposes of this Act; and (3) there is no showing that the records pursuant to which
the delivery was made, did not-meet reasonable commercial standards of practice in the industry."
Id.
logThis includes any dividends, interest or any other interest realized or accruing on the property. Id. § 21 at 359.
110For example, the state administrator will generally hold shares of stock, obtained pursuant
to section 10, for three years before sale. In such event, the owner is entitled to dividends, interest
or other increments accruing on the property during such time. Id. at 359.
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the earlier Act did not entitle the owner to receive any increments accruing
from the property once it was paid to the state. It was supposedly included
because section 22 provides some substantial retention periods by the state
administrator,"' but it also can encourage the administrator to sell the property more quickly so the state can deposit the money into the general treasury
and not lose the time value of the money. The state administrator, in section
22, is required to sell the abandoned property to the highest bidder at a public
sale within three years after receiving it."' Significantly, the purchaser of
property at the public sale takes free of all claims of the owner or previous
holder. Generally, public sales are governed by the doctrine of caveat emptor.
However, if a purchaser is certain he can take the property free of any encumbrances, both the ability of the administrator to sell abandoned property at
public sales, and the revenue received from these sales should be considerably

enhanced.
Section 23 requires the state administrator to deposit money received from
holders and the proceeds of the public sales into the general treasury of the
state. 13 A separate trust fund, required to satisfy the claims of owners, is recommended to be maintained at 100,000 dollars. Because only a small percentage of owners ever claim their property once it is abandoned, good management suggests that the trust fund be based on a percentage of the total
revenue collected rather than on a specific dollar amount." 4 The provision also
to deduct various costs incurred in connection with
permits the administrator
5
the property."

" Id. § 22 at 359-60. Special rules are included in section 22 for securities listed on an established stock exchange.
112

Id.

§ 23(a) at 360.
1' The West Virginia Code requires all revenue collected and proceeds generated to be deposited into the "trust and expense fund" unless that fund exceeds $150,000. Any excess shall be
transferred to the general school fund. W. VA. CODE § 36-8-18 (1982). Making the amount retained
in the trust fund a fixed sum which does not vary with the amount of revenue collected does not
make much sense, unless a state can predict with a reasonable degree of certainty how much revenue from abandoned property they will collect each year. A better approach is for the state to first
determine an average percentage of the revenue claimed by owners which is sufficient to cover
estimated claims. Then, instead of maintaining a specific dollar amount in the trust fund, the
legislature should opt for a percentage which would more accurately estimate the necessary funds
needed to pay claims. This would allow more money to be deposited into the general treasury. For
example, in the 1981 fiscal year West Virginia collected approximately $640,000 in abandoned
property and paid about $10,000 in claims. In the 1982 fiscal year almost $860,000 was collected
and over $20,000 was paid in claims. See supra note 3. In these two years only about 2% of the
owners ever collected their property. If the trust fund were based on that percentage only about
$13,000 would have been needed in the trust fund in 1981 and about $17,000 should have been
retained in 1982. This is substantially less than the $150,000 amount which must be maintained
pursuant to W. VA. CODE § 36-8-18. The remainder could then be paid into the general treasury or
general school fund.
H5 Before making any deposit into the general treasury the state administrator may deduct,
"(1) any costs in connection with the sale of abandoned property; (2) costs of mailing and publication in connection with any abandoned property; (3) reasonable service charges; and (4) costs incurred in examining records of holders of property and in collecting the property from those holders." Id. at 360. Although no data was available to determine whether owners who later presented
113Id.
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Section 24 provides the procedure whereby persons, excluding other states,
may file claims to recover their property.11 Section 25 describes when and how
another state may present a claim to recover the property. If the administrator
allows the claim, the state claiming the property must agree to indemnify the
forum state and its officers and employees against any liability on a claim for
the property. 11 7 If one claiming to be the owner is aggrieved by the administrator's decision, section 26 permits an appeal of the claim to a court of appropriate jurisdiction."'8
Section 27 permits the administrator to refuse to receive any property
which he considers to have a value less than the expense of giving notice and of
conducting the sale.119 The holder should be aware, however, that it still must
report all abandoned property covered by the Act notwithstanding its apparent
insignificant value. Subsection (b) is a new provision permitting a holder (including, inter alia, one terminating its business) to report and deliver property
before it is presumed abandoned. 20 After delivery, the administrator must
hold the property until the dormancy period has expired. Once the dormancy
period has expired, the property is subject to the other provisions of the Act.
Subsection (b) is certainly warranted, but it does not go far enough. In some
limited situations where the holder is going out of business and cannot locate
the owner, yet the dormancy period has not expired, the holder should be required to deliver the property to the administrator. Without such a requirement, it seems likely the abandoned property will never be reported or delivered to the state.1 21 Section 28 permits the administrator to destroy property
which has insubstantial commercial value. This is a novel provision designed to
permit the state administrator to dispose of items, such as those in a safety
deposit box, Which may have some personal significance to the owner, but have
no commercial value.1 22 Section 29 requires the holder to comply with the Act
despite any statutes of limitation that might otherwise apply.1 23 Subsection

a claim to the state administrator received their full claim, pursuant to section 24, it is easy to

imagine many claims being completely wiped out by the deduction of such charges. Id. at 360.
11 Id. § 24 at 361.
117 This involves the situation discussed in section 3, supra notes 81-83, where the state of the
holder's domicile, as the second priority claimant, or the state in which the transaction out of
which the property arose, as the third priority claimant, escheats and it is later determined the
state with a higher priority is entitled to escheat. Section 25 discusses the various situations in
which a state becomes a superior claimant to the escheating state. Id. § 25.
I's Id. § 26 at 363.
119 Id. § 27 at 363-64.
-0 Id. § 27(b).
121 State administrators have a very difficult time detecting noncompliance. A provision requiring a holder to report and deliver property to the state when that holder goes out of business

would make collection of such property much easier. In the event the owner appears, the state is a
much more reliable custodian than the holder. It should be noted the dormancy period for dissolute corporations is one year. See supra note 96.
122 If the state administrator destroys or otherwise disposes of property pursuant to section
28, no action may be maintained against such administrator. Id. § 28 at 364.
121 Of particular significance is the situation when a state adopts the Uniform Act, but the
statute of limitations has run before the effective date of the Act. Without section 29(a), the holder
might successfully refuse to report or deliver property which would otherwise be subject to aban-
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(b), however, is the Act's own statute of limitation which prevents the administen years after the
trator from bringing an action against the holder more than
12
time the holder first had a duty to report the property. '
Sections 30 through 32 are designed to facilitate compliance with the Act.
Of considerable importance is section 30, which permits the administrator to
examine the holder's records regardless of whether it is believed the holder is
not complying, to determine whether the holder has, in fact, complied with the
provisions of the Act. 125 The administrator may require a holder who has not
filed a report to verify that it has or has not any unclaimed and reportable
property. If the administrator determines that a holder has failed to comply
with the Act, it may be assessed costs of examination, not to exceed the value
of the property reportable and deliverable, plus penalties discussed in section
34, infra. Section 30 is critical to the effectiveness of the Uniform Act. Without
vigorous enforcement through random auditing of holder's records, the state
administrator can never be certain whether holders are complying. Presumably, with the strong economic incentive of noncompliance, many holders will
refuse to comply with the Uniform Act unless the possibility of detection is
likely. Increased auditing, coupled with strict enforcement of penalties, should
increase compliance. Section 31 requires the holder to retain certain records
for at least ten years following the date the property was reportable as abandoned property. 126 Again, section 31, like section 30, is very important in increasing compliance. If the holder's records show the existence of abandoned
property subject to the Act, once those records are destroyed, detection of noncompliance is practically impossible. No comparable provision appeared in the
to bring an
earlier Uniform Act. Section 32 permits the state administrator
1 27
action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enforce the Act.
Section 33 is another extremely important novel provision which encourages joint agreements and cooperation among the states. The administrator is
empowered to enter into agreements with other states to exchange information
which enables each state to audit records or otherwise determine whether it is
donment. The problem has been the subject of extensive litigation. See, e.g., Country Mutual Ins.
Co. v. Knight, 40 Ill.2d 523, 240 N.E.2d 612 (1968); Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Cranston, 24 Cal. Rptr.
851, 374 P.2d 819 (1962).
124This potentially has both positive and negative consequences. It encourages states to investigate holder's records to determine whether they have abandoned property subject to the Act; if
the state waits more than ten years after the holder had a duty to report, the claim is barred. It
also relieves holder's from the burden of maintaining their records for more than ten years after

they first had a duty to report the property. See infra note 126 and accompanying text. However,
it is possible that subsection (b) could encourage holders to conceal property with the hope that
ten years pass before any detection is made. If this occurs, subsection (b) may provide undesirable
results.
125

UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROPERTY AcT, 8 U.L.A. § 30 at 365 (Supp. 1983) (1981 version).

This should be read in conjunction with section 29(b). See supra note 124 and accompanying text. Section 31 does, however, permit the state administrator to shorten the retention period
upon consideration of the burden imposed on the holder in maintaining such records, the opportunity of returning the property, and the holder's type of business. Id. § 31 at 366-67.
127 The state will normally sue in its own courts, but in those situations where personal jurisdiction cannot be easily obtained over the holder in that state, the action may be brought in a
court of competent jurisdiction in another state. Id. § 32 at 367. See supra note 82.
128
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entitled to claim property held in another state.'28 This is especially important
when the state of the last known address of the owner has difficulty asserting
jurisdiction over the holder to compel it to file reports. 12 9 More importantly,
section 33 permits the attorney general of a state to bring an action in the
name of the administrator of another state to compel the holder to deliver
abandoned property to the state. 30 In essence, the participating states become
collection agents for each other. Through these reciprocal agreements, the state
of the last known address of the owner can recover property it is legally entitled to, but which it might not validly assert personal jurisdiction over in its
own courts. This prevents the state from having to bear the increased expense
of bringing suit in the foreign state. If every state would enact such a provision
and enter into such agreements, the jurisdictional problems would no longer
exist. Unfortunately, states like Delaware, who have very liberal corporation
laws, would probably frown on such a provision because they receive unclaimed
property as the second priority claimant under Texas v. New Jersey, whenever
the state of the last known address of the shareholder cannot claim the
13 1
property.
Section 34, like section 25 of the earlier Uniform Act, imposes civil and
criminal penalties for noncompliance. 32 The Commissioners' Comment indicates that a major weakness of the 1966 Act was its ineffective penalty provision which placed too much reliance on the criminal law as a compliance mechanism. The experience of Uniform Act states is that many holders find the
economic incentive for noncompliance so great, violations are frequent and extensive.1 3 3 Only through the strict imposition of penalties will holders be deterred from refusing to comply with the Act.
Section 35 is a new provision designed to limit the activities of "heir
finders."' 3 It prohibits heir finder activity for a two-year period following payment or delivery of abandoned property to the state." 5 The remaining provisions, sections 36 through 43, provide general rules of construction."16
12

Id. § 33, at 367-68.

See supra notes 44-66 and accompanying text.
UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT,8 U.L.A. § 33(d), at 367-68 (Supp. 1983) (1981 version).
"21 Anytime a corporation domiciled in Delaware holds abandoned property for an owner
whose last known address is in another state, but that state cannot assert jurisdiction over the
property, Delaware is entitled to collect the property as the second priority claimant. Therefore,
Delaware realizes a substantial benefit when the state of the last known address of the owner does
not have an escheat statute, or if that state cannot assert personal jurisdiction over the holder, or
if the owner is in a foreign country, or if the owner is unknown, or if for any other reason the state
of the last known address of the owner cannot assert jurisdiction over the property.
22 UNIF. UNCLAIMED PROPERTY AcT, 8 U.L.A. § 34 at 368-69 (Supp. 1983) (1981 version).
233 Id.
124 "Heir finders" is a term which describes the small, but active businesses which, pursuant
to contract and usually for a percentage of the amount recovered, attempt to locate owners of
abandoned property. Id. § 35 at 336. They are also referred to as "head hunters" in the industry.
129

12.UNI'.

121

Id.

at 369.

The general rules in sections 36-43 may be summarized as follows: pursuant to section 36,
the Uniform Act does not apply to wholly foreign transactions; section 37 requires the holder to
comply with the Act as it relates to property held before the effective date of the Act; the state
administrator may adopt necessary rules to carry out the provisions of the Act in section 38; sec120
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PROPOSED CHANGES TO WEST VIRGINIA'S UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT

West Virginia adopted the 1954 version of the Uniform Act virtually intact. 137 There have been no reported decisions in West Virginia concerning the
Act's application. On March 12, 1983, the final day of the session, the West
Virginia Legislature adopted a revised version of its Uniform Act. 138 Unlike the
1981 Uniform Act's comprehensive revisions, the changes adopted in West Virginia's Uniform Act are not nearly so extensive. House Bill 1454 amends only
seven sections of the Act and provides for the addition of two new sections. 139
The provision most substantially changed is section 2 which subjects certain property held by banking and financial institutions to the Act.240 The
previous fifteen year dormancy period remains intact for any interest bearing
demand, savings or matured time deposit141 and for any interest bearing funds
1 41
paid toward the purchase of shares or other items of a financial organization.

The dormancy periods for the same noninterest bearing funds are reduced to
seven years.1 43 The dormancy periods for any sum payable on, inter alia, a
certificate of deposit and draft1 44 and personal property in safety deposit
boxes 45 are reduced from fifteen years to seven years. A fifteen year dormancy
period seems inconsistent with the other classes of property in West Virginia's
Uniform Act and the 1981 Uniform Act.
Banking and financial organizations are prevented from imposing any service charge due to the dormancy or inactivity of the owner's property unless
there is an enforceable written contract between the holder and the owner allowing such charges.1 46 This is an important provision because it prevents the
holder from gradually reducing and potentially eliminating the owner's property with the imposition of service charges unless a contract allows the charges.
Apparently some banks are attempting to unilaterally modify these deposit account contracts with their customers by posting notice signs in the bank
lobby. 47 Whether this notice effectively modifies the existing contract so as to
conform with the Act is questionable without express agreement by the customer. However, even if a customer agreed to such a clause there is further
danger that the service charges might be excessive and the Act provides no
tion 39 is the severability clause intended to make sure that any provisions found to be invalid do
not effect other valid provisions; pursuant to section 40 the Act is to be applied and construed

uniformly; section 41 titles the Act as the Uniform Unclaimed Property Act; section 42 is intended
to repeal previous inconsistent Acts; and section 43 provides the time when the Uniform Act shall
take effect. Id. at 369-71.
137 See supra note 2.

138 H.B. 1454.

139 Id.
140 Id. at 2-6.
141 Id. § 2(b) at 2-3.
142 Id. § 2(d) at 4.
143 Id. § 2(a) and § 2(c) at 2-3.
'44 Id. § 2(e) at 4-5.
I'l Id. § 2(f) at 5.
140 Id. § 2(g) at 5.
147 Telephone Interview with Mr. Randy Barton, Abandoned Property Division, State Treasurer's Office (March 24, 1983).
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protection against this. The owner's property would still be gradually reduced
and eliminated, but the bank is arguably protected by a contract enforcing the
service charge. Section 5(b) of the 1981 Uniform Act has a different approach.
It only permits the holder to deduct charges when the owner fails to present
the instrument for payment if a valid contract exists and the holder regularly
imposes such charges and does not regularly reverse or otherwise cancel
them.148 This appears to provide more protection for the owner. Although a
court would presumably require that any service charges be "reasonable," the
word "reasonable" should appear in subsection (e) to avoid any confusion.
The only changes to sections 4 through 8, relating to property held by
utilities, business associations, fiduciaries, and courts, public officers and agencies, resulted in increases in the dormancy periods from five to seven years.149
Both the National Conference of Commissioners and the state treasurer's office
favored a five year dormancy period for all classes of property and opposed any
such increases. 50 Nevertheless, the legislature failed to adopt their suggestions
and selected seven year dormancy periods for those classes of property. The
1981 Act provides for a five year dormancy period for property held by business associations and fiduciaries and only a one year dormancy period for deposits and refunds held by utilities and intangible property held by courts and
1 51
public agencies.

Section 9, the catch-all provision which previously applied only to intangible personal property, is amended to cover both tangible and intangible personal property. 152 This conforms with Texas v. New Jersey which said that
with respect to tangible personal property, only the state in which the property
is located may escheat. 15 3 This is a welcomed addition because it provides an
express provision making holders aware that tangible property located in this
state is subject to the Act, even if the owner resides out of state. Section 9 also
prevents any banking or financial organization from levying any service charges
on the owner of any savings account. 1 "
Section 11, requiring the holder to file abandoned property reports, is
amended to allow the state treasurer to examine the holder's records if there is
reason to believe the holder has failed to comply. 155 Previously, the state trea-

surer was only permitted to examine the holder's records upon issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum.

58

If after such examination it is determined there was

property which should have been reported, the treasurer may assess the holder
costs not to exceed the value of the property reportable. Section 11 was
amended to make it easier to examine the holder's records, but the state trea148

UMF. UNCLAIMED PROPERTY AcT, 8 U.L.A.

149

H.B. 1454 at 5-7.

§ 5(b) at 345-46 (Supp. 1983) (1981 version).

150 Telephone Interview with Mr. Randy Barton, Abandoned Property Division, State Trea.

surer's Office (March 24, 1983).
5' See supra notes 87-89, 96 and accompanying text.
152 H.B. 1454 at 8.
:53 379 U.S. at 679.
" H.B. 1454 at 8.
155 Id. at 8-10.
See W. VA. CoDE § 36-8-23 (1982).
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surer still must have "reason to believe" the holder has failed to comply. Section 30(b) of the 1981 Act permits the state administrator to audit the holder's
records even if there is "no reason to believe" the holder has failed to comply.'1' It should be remembered that civil and criminal penalties may also be
available in such a situation. 15 8 The power to examine records is one which
should be used frequently, however this power can only be exercised effectively
if the state's abandoned property division is adequately staffed and well
trained.
Section 17, which required the state treasurer to sell the abandoned property within one year, is
amended to permit the treasurer to sell the property
"as soon as practical."'159 In most instances, it is not practical for the property
to be sold within one year. However, the requirement that the treasurer sell
the property "as soon as practical" may provide the treasurer with too much
discretion. How long is "as soon as practical"? In contrast, the 1981 Uniform
Act provides that all property must be sold within three years following
delivery.' 60
Section 12(a) provides that records of abandoned property be kept confidential except with respect to requests for inspection and copying made by
certain persons with a claim.'"' The records are also exempt from the Freedom
of Information Act in chapter 29B of the Code.' 6 ' These rules are designed to
prevent "heir finders" from obtaining this information and locating the owner
for a percentage of the recovery. However, section 12(a) merely eliminates the
state treasurer's office as a source of information. "Heir finders" can read the
state treasurer's published notices and still locate the owner for a percentage of
the recovery.' 6 3 The approach is different than section 35 of the 1981 Uniform
Act which prohibits heir finder activity for two years after the property is paid
or delivered to the state.'
Finally, section 23(a) permits interstate agreements and cooperation between states, commonly referred to as "compact agreements", like section 33 of
the 1981 Uniform Act.' 6 5 This is an extremely valuable provision which should
further compliance. However, unlike section 33 of the 1981 Act, section 23(a)
does not include a provision which permits the attorney general to bring an
action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enforce another state's abandoned property law, if the other state has a provision providing the same treatment to this state. This essentially enables participating states to serve as collection agents for each other. Such a provision would help this state to avoid a
holder's potential lack of jurisdiction argument.'"6 The state treasurer's office

See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
'a"W. VA. CODE § 36-8-25 (1982).
119 H.B. 1454 at 10-11.
1o See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
1s H.B. 1454 at 10.
162 Id.
163See W. VA. CODE § 36-8-12 (1982).
:1 See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
6 H.B. 1454 at 11. See also, supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
166 See supra notes 44-66 and accompanying text.
157
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feels that such a provision is not necessary because it can be included in "compact agreements" with other states."' 7
The recent revisions in West Virginia's Uniform Act incorporate only a
few desirable provisions of the 1981 Act. Among these are provisions which
permit compact agreements and make it easier for the state treasurer to examine the holder's records. The confidentiality of records should lessen the
activities of heir finders, thereby reducing the number of claims brought by
owners or their heirs. An express provision making the Act applicable to tangible property should increase compliance and the revenue collected from tangible property. Despite these few improvements, West Virginia's revisions fail to
adopt many of the 1981 Act's recommendations.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
promulgated comprehensive revisions of the 1981 Act primarily to increase
compliance by reducing uncertainty. Much of this uncertainty arose as a result
of Texas v. New Jersey, however West Virginia's revisions make no mention of
Texas v. New Jersey, and therefore do nothing to reduce that uncertainty. The
1981 Act also reduces uncertainty by more clearly defining terms used in the
Act and classes of property subject to the Act; however, West Virginia failed to
make such improvements. The dormancy periods are increased rather than decreased for most classes of property. The longer this state must wait to collect
abandoned property, the less property it will collect. The inescapable conclusion is that many of the provisions adopted by the 1981 Act were not seriously
considered by the West Virginia Legislature.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The 1981 Uniform Unclaimed Property Act contains a comprehensive set
of provisions which substantially improve existing legislation. Since the Uniform Act was first adopted in 1954, many developments have occurred necessitating changes in abandoned and unclaimed property statutes. The 1981 Uniform Act more clearly defines the rights and duties of the state, the holders
and the owners of abandoned property. The Act should result in increased
state revenues because its provisions facilitate the ability of states to obtain
compliance from holders. In addition to the benefits available to states, the
1981 Act provides greater protection for the owners of abandoned property.
The uncertainties left by the 1954 Uniform Act have resulted in a significant degree of noncompliance by holders. Section 3 of the 1981 Act, which
contains the scheme of priority devised by the Supreme Court in Texas v. New
Jersey, should substantially reduce that uncertainty. Certain express provisions making, inter alia, underlying stock certificates, wages, credit memos and
gift certificates subject to the Act will make it clear holders must report these
items. Such express provisions were absent from the earlier Act. The more precise wording of various definitions and classes of property subject to the Act
were needed to prevent the holder from arguing that it, or a particular item of
'67 Telephone interview with Mr. Randy Barton, Abandoned Property Division, State Treasurer's Office (March 24, 1983).
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intangible property it holds is not covered by the Act. By reducing the uncertainty of whether a holder or an item of property it holds, is subject to the Act,
states should obtain greater compliance with their abandoned property statutes which will increase state revenues.
The 1981 Uniform Act contains many other provisions that should improve compliance. Reduction in dormancy periods for most classes of property
will enable enacting states to collect a greater percentage of abandoned property. Section 30 provides the state administrator with more authority to examine holder's records. The ability of the administrator to assess the costs of
examination and to impose more effective civil and criminal penalties upon
holders is important in obtaining compliance. Section 33, which permits participating states to serve as collection agents for each other, will enable a state to
avoid the holder's potential lack of personal jurisdiction argument. These provisions and many others in the 1981 Act were desperately needed to improve
compliance.
There are several provisions which more adequately protect the rights of
owners of abandoned property. Section 21 permits the owner to recover any
interest, dividend or other increment accruing on the property before it is liquidated. Banks and financial organizations are not permitted to impose service
charges upon the owner's property unless certain conditions are satisfied. Although section 20 relieves the holder of liability for property delivered to the
administrator, the owner can still maintain an action against the holder if the
delivery was not made in "good faith."
The West Virginia Legislature enacted only a few of the improved revisions contained in the 1981 Act. Among these are the provision which prevents
banking and financial institutions from imposing service charges on the owner's property until satisfying certain conditions, a section which expressly
makes the Act applicable to tangible property, one which makes it easier for
the state treasurer to audit holder's records, and a section which encourages
interstate agreements and cooperation between states. Despite improvements
in these areas, the revised Act departs from the 1981 Uniform Act in too many
respects. No improvements were made in the definition of terms and classes of
property subject to the Act. A glaring omission is the absence of a provision
bringing the Act into compliance with Texas v. New Jersey. Unfortunately, the
dormancy periods are increased rather than decreased for most classes of property. This more than any other provision could reduce revenue collected under
the Act.
It appears that the legislature merely selected a few of the 1981 Uniform
Act's provisions without seriously considering the remaining ones; especially
since the revisions fail to incorporate the substantial changes brought by Texas
v. New Jersey. The recent amendments represent a movement in the right direction for all but the lengthened dormancy periods, but they do not go nearly
far enough. Considering that West Virginia collected almost $1,500,000 from
abandoned property in the past two years alone, such a substantial nontax
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source of revenue should prompt the legislature to take a more serious look at
the 1981 Uniform Act and make further revisions.
James Dartlin Meadows
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